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RACE, CLASS, CASTE . . .  ? RETlllNKING 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION1 
Clark D. Cunningham* 
and N.R. Madhava Menon** 
Many who oppose affirmative action programs in the United 
States because they use "racial" categories such as black, African 
American, or Latino, claim that equally effective and more equita­
ble programs can be developed using only class categories, such as 
"low income."2 A key test case for the "race v. class" debate is 
admission to law schools, made urgent by recent legal prohibitions 
on the use of "race" in the admission procedures to state universi­
ties in California, Washington, and Texas.3 An empirical study by 
Linda Wightman, the former director of research for the Law 
School Admissions Council (LSAC), has shown that had a "race­
blind" admissions process - based solely on undergraduate grade 
point average (GPA) and scores on the national Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT) administered by the LSAC - been ap­
plied to the group of persons entering law school in 1991, ninety 
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. B.A. 1975, Dartmouth; J.D. 
1981, Wayne State. - Ed. Email address: cunningc@law.wustl.edu. 
** Member, Law Commission, Government of India. B.Sc. 1953, B.L. (Law) 1955, 
Kerala; M.A. 1960, Punjab; LL.M. 1962, Aligarh Muslim; Ph.D. 1968, Aligarh Muslim - Ed. 
This analysis is based on a longer paper written by Cunningham and Menon while Menon 
was dean of the National Law School of India and does not necessarily reflect positions of 
the Government of India. 
1. This analysis and a response by Cass R. Sunstein, which appears at 97 MICH. L. REv. 
1311 (1999), were the subject of a public panel discussion on September 9, 1998, at Washing· 
ton University led by Professors Cunningham and Sunstein with comments by four other 
Washington University faculty - Barbara Flagg (law), Pauline Kim (law), Sunita Parikh 
(political science), and Robert Pollak (economics and business) - and subsequently on Janu­
ary 14, 1999, of a faculty workshop sponsored by the Department of Government, 
Dartmouth College. The authors thank the commentators and participants at those sessions 
for their suggestions on the draft. 
2. For a good summary and critique of the "class-based" alternative approach to affirma· 
tive action, see Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 
74 TEXAS L. REv. 1847 (1996). 
3. The debate over law school admissions runs the risk of greatly oversimplifying the 
variety of justifications for affirmative action. For example, it focuses more on the need of an 
excluded group for access to a scarce resource than on the value to the larger society of 
inclusion of many groups regardless of need; it also assumes that racist decisionmaking is no 
longer a threat, surely a dangerous assumption in other contexts such as employment and 
contracting. We use the law school admission problem only as an illustration, fully aware 
that a nonracial approach that helps resolve that problem may not adequately address other 
contexts where race-based affirmative action is now found. 
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percent of those self-identified as "black" would not have been ad­
mitted to any law school in the United States.4 Adding a prefer­
ence based on socioeconomic factors to the GPA/LSAT criteria 
would not have significantly increased the number of African 
Americans because among applicants with similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds, those self-identified as "white" significantly out­
performed African Americans on the LSAT.5 One response to 
such evidence as presented by Wightman's study is simply to argue 
for the restoration of traditional racial categories to admission crite­
ria. Another response, though, is to seek a new category to be used 
to modify the GPA/LSAT criteria, a category that might correlate 
lower performance on standardized testing with current social 
structures more precisely than socioeconomic "class," yet would be 
sufficiently distinguishable from the increasingly forbidden classifi­
cation of "race." Such a category should be both theoretically co­
herent and empirically grounded. P roposals appearing in recent 
legal scholarship to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment in 
terms of an "anticaste" or "anti-pariah" principle appear to be one 
attempt to develop such an alternative criteria: caste. 
The use of "caste" in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
has, of course, a long tradition, with origins in the Reconstruction 
Congressional debates on the Amendment,6 and most famously in 
4. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analy­
sis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1997). Wightman's analysis is supported by the actual experi­
ence at the Texas Law School and the University of California Law School in Berkeley after 
these schools were prohibited from using race as an admission criteria: the number of 
African-American students admitted to the Texas Law School dropped from 65 in 1996 to 11 
in 1997. Telephone Interview with M. Michael Sharlot, Dean, Unive:rsity of Texas Law 
School (Mar. 9, 1999). At Berkeley, the number of African-American students admitted 
went from 75 in 1996 to 14 in 1997. See Affirmative Action Loses Ground, ST. Louis Posr 
DISPATCH, July 8, 1997, at B6. It is important to note that Wightman's study also indicates 
that 78% of those black students admitted to law school in 1991 who would have been ex­
cluded by using GPA/LSAT criteria did in fact graduate, and 73% of those black graduates 
(who would have been excluded) did pass a bar examination. See Wightman, supra, at 36-38. 
The 73% bar passage rate is a projection based on data available to Wightman. See id. at 37. 
5. The mean LSAT score for black students was consistently seven to nine points lower 
than white students of the same socioeconomic class for each of the four socioeconomic clas­
sifications used. See Wightman, supra note 4, at 44. Indeed, the group of black law students 
classified as "Upper Class" (both parents had graduate or professional training and held 
professional jobs) had a mean LSAT score about six points lower than white law students in 
the lowest classification, "Lower-Middle" (neither parent college-educated and both engaged 
in blue collar work). See id. at 41-44. 
6. See cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2435 (1994) 
("[T]he purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ... '[do] away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another."' (second alteration in 
original) (quoting CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Howard))). 
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Justice Harlan's dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson.7 Indeed, according to 
one recent law review article, the word "caste" appears in thirty-six 
Supreme Court cases.8 However, both the venerable and recent 
references to "caste" fail to make explicit which features of 
American society are thought to be analogous to the generally rec­
ognized referent of "caste" - the traditional social structure of 
India - an omission which particularly represents missed opportu­
nity, given that India has a much longer legal history of affirmative 
action jurisprudence than does the United States. Characterizing 
the use of "caste" in American jurisprudence as "at best an effec­
tive hyperbole" for "forms of unjust social hierarchy" rather than a 
serious comparison with "true" caste societies, Jack Balkin has re­
cently suggested that "caste" either be "jettison[ed]" or "serious[ly] 
reapprais[ ed]" as an explanatory category.9 
We urge reappraisal rather than abandonment of the caste anal­
ogy: a reappraisal that would prompt American legal scholars to 
begin a long overdue look beyond their own borders for fresh ideas 
on the affirmative action debate.10 
CASS SUNSTEIN'S ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE 
To illustrate, we will focus on one of the most influential and 
extensively reasoned of these recent law review articles, The 
Anticaste Principle, by Cass Sunstein.11 He proposes that the 
7. The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, 
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste 
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
8. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 
257, 270 n.59 (1996). 
9. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2358 (1997). 
10. An important first step in this expansion of perspectives took place on November 8-
10, 1997, when Washington University hosted an international conference, Rethinking Equal­
ity in the Global Society, that brought together leading legal scholars, social scientists, and 
policy makers from the United States, India, and South Africa, including Justice Jeevan 
Reddy, author of the majority opinion in the most important Indian Supreme Court case on 
affirmative action, Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India), and Profes­
sor M.N. Srinivas, a distinguished Indian sociologist and the leading expert in the world on 
the caste system. See Conference, Rethinking Equality in the Global Society, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1561 (1997) [hereinafter Rethinking Equality Conference] (providing transcripts of the 
plenary and panel sessions on the final day of the conference); Rethinking Equality in the 
Global Society (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equality> (publishing 
conference papers by Cunningham & Menon, Reddy, and Govender (a South African 
scholar), information about the participants, a bibliography, and related materials). 
11. Sunstein, supra note 6. 
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Fourteenth Amendment be reconceived, both as to original intent 
and current application, in terms of what he calls "the anticaste 
principle." This principle, as he defines it, would require that "so­
cial and legal structures should not turn differences that are both 
highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of view into sys­
tematic social disadvantages."12 In contrast to the dominant "anti­
discrimination" interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
anticaste principle does not treat affirmative action as a limited ex­
ception to the constitutional guarantee of equality, but rather as a 
logical, perhaps necessary, method of correcting the effects of caste, 
which interfere with equality. 
Sunstein seems to have several objectives in proposing this ap­
proach. First, he is seeking a theoretically coherent and morally 
appealing justification for affirmative action. Second, he wants to 
offer a principled and empirically grounded basis for deciding which 
groups should receive the benefits of affirmative action. Third, he 
wants to shift greater responsibility and authority for implementing 
the Fourteenth Amendment from the judiciary to the legislature 
and executive. 
Sunstein seems to believe that reconceiving the Fourteenth 
Amendment in terms of eradicating caste rather than preventing 
discrimination would change the affirmative action debate in two 
fundamental ways. First, if, as Sunstein asserts, "the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution was [and should be] understood as 
an effort to eliminate racial caste - emphatically not as a ban on 
distinctions on the basis of race,"13 the range of persons who can 
make Fourteenth Amendment claims would be drastically reduced 
from the entire population (all of whom have a "race") to those 
who are members of a low caste. Thus "reverse discrimination" 
claims by whites affected by affirmative action would disappear.14 
Second, it would not be necessary to prove discrimination - either 
contemporaneous discrimination against an individual plaintiff or 
historical discrimination against that person's group - since the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be to prevent or 
remedy discrimination but rather to alter "systemic social 
disadvantage." 
12. Id. at 2429 (emphasis omitted). 
13. Id. at 2439. 
14. See id. at 2452 ("On the account I have offered, there is no constitutional objection to 
genuinely remedial race- and sex-conscious policies, at least as a general rule. If a basic goal 
is opposition to caste, affirmative action policies are ordinarily permissible." {footnote 
omitted)). 
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One recurring criticism of affirmative action programs points to 
the absence of "any neutral decisionmaking mechanisms" for decid­
ing which groups deserve special treatment and describes the result 
as "a crude political struggle between groups seeking favored sta­
tus."15 In response to such criticism, Sunstein offers two criteria for 
selecting groups: (1) a highly visible, morally irrelevant characteris­
tic; and (2) systemic social disadvantage. 
It is not entirely clear why Sunstein insists under his principle 
that a necessary feature of a low-caste group is a "highly visible" 
characteristic. Part of his rationale appears to be a theory that low­
caste status is created in part by market forces that "rationally" use 
race and gender as "cheap proxies" for costly but more accurate 
methods of acquiring information about morally relevant individual 
traits, such as educational attainment or work ethic.16 A second, 
related rationale is that a "highly visible" characteristic "will proba­
bly trigger reactions from others in a wide variety of spheres," thus 
causing social disadvantage to be "systemic."17 Common to both 
rationales is the assumption that the primary disadvantage of being 
a member of a low caste derives from the psychological attitudes, 
and consequent behavior, of a person's contemporaries who have 
power over various aspects of life (for example, prospective em­
ployers, teachers, police officers). Sunstein emphasizes the behav­
ior of a person's "contemporaries" because a history of 
discrimination against a group is not a necessary criterion for low­
caste status under his analysis;18 rather, he assumes that high visibil­
ity of group status is necessary and sufficient to cause caste effects.19 
Sunstein's second criterion is systematic social disadvantage: 
"[T]he inquiry into caste has a large empirical dimension . . .  fo­
cus[ing] on whether one group is systematically below others along 
15. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 1312, 1321 (1986). Writing for herself and three other justices in City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justice O'Connor stated that one reason that race­
based affirmative action required strict scrutiny was the risk of "simple racial politics, " 488 
U.S. at 493, noting that a majority of the city council that adopted a plan favoring African­
American contractors were themselves African American. See 488 U. S. at 495. 
16. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2416, 2430-31. 
17. Id. at 2432-33. 
18. See id. at 2433. Sunstein does add that a history of discrimination is "highly prob­
able " for low-caste groups. See id. 
19. See id. at 2432 ("When the group characteristic is not highly visible, we cannot have a 
caste system as I understand here . . . .  "); id. at 2431 ("The [caste] system can operate largely 
because of the high visibility of the group characteristic."). Sunstein does also state that 
"[f]or some purposes .. . it might make sense to speak as well of characteristics that, while 
not highly visible, are easily verified. " Id. at 2432. But he goes on to say that "the argument 
I am making works best when the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly visible." Id. 
March 1999] Rethinking Affirmative Action 1301 
important dimensions of social welfare."2° For Sunstein the key 
dimensions are income level, rate of employment, level of educa­
tion, longevity, crime victimization, and ratio of elected political 
representatives to percentage of population.21 
Sunstein would apply his anticaste principle to extend affirma­
tive action from African Americans, the original "low caste" that 
concerned the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to women. 
Jews, Asian Americans, and homosexuals would be excluded be­
cause the latter three groups do not place low on his scale of socio­
economic indicators and thus do not meet the systemic social 
disadvantage criteria. 2  His principle would also exclude homosex­
uals and the poor on the separate ground that these groups are not 
visually identifiable.23 
The Fourteenth Amendment by its terms looks to the legislature 
to implement the guarantee of equality. Sunstein links the shift 
from the original anticaste principle to the current antidiscrimina­
tion interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment - "one of the 
great untold stories of American constitutional history"24 - to a 
twentieth-century transfer of responsibility and authority from 
Congress to the courts. As courts assumed a primary role, they re­
cast the guarantee of equality in terms of the antidiscrimination 
principle - persons similarly situated must be treated similarly -
which was more hospitable to judicial thinking and amenable to ju­
dicial processes. In contrast, Sunstein asserts, the "judiciary simply 
lacks the necessary tools to implement the anticaste principle . . . 
[which], if taken seriously, calls for significant restructuring of social 
practices. For this reason legislative and administrative bodies, with 
their superior democratic pedigree and fact-finding capacities, can 
better implement the principle .... "25 
20. Id. at 2444. 
21. See id. at 2429, 2444-49 (citing data comparing African Americans to whites and 
women to men). 
22. See id. at 2443-44. 
23. See id. at 2433 & n.74 (excluding homosexuals); id. at 2438 (excluding the poor). 
Farber and Sherry's "pariah principle," although also based on an analogy to the Indian caste 
system, differs from Sunstein's anticaste principle by protecting homosexuals, because they 
are - like India's "untouchables" - treated as extreme social outcasts; socioeconomic con­
dition and visually identifiable group status are not relevant to their use of the caste analogy. 
See Farber & Sherry, supra note 8, at 272-73. 
24. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2440. 
25. Id. 
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RA.CE, CLASS OR CASTE: LOOKING AT THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 
Although Sunstein includes a qualifier that his use of "caste" 
differs in some degree from the features of what he calls "genuine 
caste systems" such as India, he does assume that his theory con­
forms to the basic features of India's caste system. Indeed he 
counts on the aptness of the analogy to provide both coherence and 
moral force to his thesis: "[T]he similarities between true caste sys­
tems and existing American inequalities are what make our current 
practices a reason for collective concern."26 We agree that the anal­
ogy is apt and powerful, and the general framework of his analysis 
tracks the Indian experience well. However, there are also striking 
contrasts between the way Sunstein imagines his anticaste principle 
would be implemented and the reality of India's fifty years of con­
stitutional jurisprudence. The contrasts do not detract from the 
value of the caste analogy; but they should, we think, prompt fur­
ther and perhaps even more fundamental rethinking of the Ameri­
can approach to affirmative action. 
The persistent metaphoric use of "caste" seems to arise out of a 
need for several kinds of semantic resources. First, the term is 
more general than "race" and is felt to be a coherent category that 
includes otherwise seemingly disparate groups claiming need for af­
firmative action. Second, it connects disadvantage to social struc­
ture rather than simply cognitive bias or hostility. Third, it gives 
defenders of affirmative action a rhetorical moral imperative that 
counteracts the force of the "colorblind" position.27 Perhaps 
"caste" mobilizes these resources precisely because its use connects 
the American dilemma in deep ways to a phenomenon that is truly 
global. If so, points of similarity and contrast between societies like 
the United States and India may both be highly salient. 
One difference is that Sunstein's anticaste principle seems to fo­
cus only on the disadvantages created by a caste system. The his­
toric caste system in India was truly systemic: everyone had a place 
within it. As a result, the caste system not only drastically exploited 
and disadvantaged certain groups, such as the erstwhile untouch­
ables; it also concentrated advantage in other groups, such as the 
Brahmins. Both suffering and success were largely attributable to 
where one was born into the social hierarchy rather than individual 
effort and virtue. Thus, India's approach to affirmative action has a 
26. Id. at 2429. 
27. Being against "caste " rather than "color-conscious " seems a move similar to being 
"pro-choice " as an alternative to being "anti-life " in the abortion debate. 
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more complex origin than the comparable civil rights movement in 
the United States.28 Two different efforts converged in the early 
twentieth century to change the caste system, one starting at the 
bottom (the "backward classes" movement), and another more 
mass-based initiative attacking the top (the anti-Brahmin move­
ment). When the drafters of India's constitution met in 1948, they 
were confronted not only with demands to alleviate the suffering of 
a pitiful minority, but also to reduce the power of a privileged elite 
and redistribute the benefits they had monopolized (particularly 
seats in higher education and positions in government employment) 
to a larger segment of the population - "turning the caste system 
on its head." The drafters worked out a complex compromise, fur­
ther developed by the courts, that has served to regulate this slow­
motion social ·revolution by insisting that reservation programs be 
developed through a transparent, rationalized process to avoid a 
political spoils system and imposing limits that leave open some av­
enues for advancement based on merit.29 In contrast, Sunstein does 
not seem to contemplate that his anticaste principle would have sig­
nificant long-term redistributive effects: "The anticaste principle 
seems to have greatest appeal in discrete contexts . . in which there 
will be no major threat to a market economy; and in which the costs 
of implementation are most unlikely to be terribly high."30 
In addition to contemplating more limited reform, Sunstein's 
anticaste principle makes basic assumptions about caste in the 
United States that differ in two crucial respects from the caste sys­
tem in India. First, the Indian caste system operates without 
"highly visible" physiological characteristics; a high-caste Indian 
might be physically very similar to a low-caste Indian. Second, 
Sunstein describes a caste system as using social and legal structures 
to turn highly visible differences "into systematic social disadvan­
tages,"31 yet in India causation worked in the other direction. So­
cial and legal structures began with systemic social disadvantage 
28. The leading study of the development of India's affirmative action jurisprudence by 
an American legal scholar is MARc GALANIER, COMPETING EauALmES: LAW AND THE 
BACKWARD CLASSES IN !NDIA (1984). Another excellent book, by an American political 
scientist, that also covers important events after Galanter's work was published, is SUNITA 
PARIKH, THE PoLmcs OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE Ac. 
TION IN THE UNITED STATES AND !NDIA (1997). A collection of essays by leading Indian 
intellectuals, including several critiques of the current system of affirmative action in India, 
can be found in CASTE: !TS TwENTIETH CENTURY AVATAR (M.N. Srinivas ed., 1996). 
29. See Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Seeking Equality in Multicultural 
Societies (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences!Equality/art-23index.html>. 
30. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2438. 
31. Id. at 2429 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 2430 ("the highly visible but morally 
irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to lower-caste status") (emphasis added); id. at 2433 
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and then created stigmatic differences (distinctive garb, segregation, 
and practices of physical avoidance) to mark the disadvantage.32 
Perhaps because caste in India is so clearly a social construction 
- in contrast to continuing folk beliefs in the United States that 
"race" is an immutable and obvious physical condition - Indian 
jurisprudence has advanced well beyond American law in con­
structing and justifying affirmative action in terms of underlying so­
cial features as disclosed by empirical research. Instead of relying 
on folk categories, Indian law has created a set of artificial legal 
categories: Scheduled Castes ("SCs"), the referent of which are the 
formerly untouchable castes; Scheduled Tribes ("STs"), referring to 
isolated hill groups with aboriginal cultural features; and the "other 
backward classes" ("OBCs"), the most interesting and controversial 
category. The OBC category extends the principle of affirmative 
action in education and government employment from the paradig­
matic case of the untouchables to "socially and educationally back­
ward classes of citizens." Considered in light of the current 
American "all or nothing" debate over whether race or class should 
be the basis for affirmative action, the Indian approach is particu­
larly thought-provoking: both traditional low-caste status and eco­
nomic class are factors in determining whether a group is 
categorized as an OBC, but neither by itself is considered sufficient. 
The definition of OBC, found in the constitutional text, refers to 
"social and economic" backwardness rather than economic status; 
the deliberate use of the term "classes" rather than "castes" has 
been interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court to refer to general 
social groupings rather than economic classes. Indeed, experiments 
several decades ago in India which relied entirely on economic sta­
tus had results similar to those predicted by American opponents of 
the "class" approach: lower income members of more privileged 
communities took virtually all the reservations. 
Sunstein's proposal and the Indian approach have in common 
the use of such empirical data as income and educational attain­
ment. India has boldly explored "the path not taken" in Bakke, 
identifying more than 3,500 distinct social groups as needing prefer­
ential treatment and reserving up to fifty percent of all new central 
government jobs for members of these groups. Similar quotas exist 
for higher education, including exclusive medical and engineering 
schools. This system has been fifty years in the making, going back 
("Under the principle I am describing, a history of discrimination is not a necessary condition 
for status as a lower caste, though in practice such a history is highly probable."). 
32. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29. 
March 1999] Rethinking Affirmative Action 1305 
to explicit provisions in India's constitutional guarantees of equality 
that authorize the government to make "special provision" for "so­
cially and educationally backward classes." In the first three de­
cades, selection of groups to receive preferential treatment was left 
largely to state governments, with the result that the Indian 
Supreme Court repeatedly struck down plans that seemed primarily 
to benefit politically powerful groups or that were based on tradi­
tional assumptions about caste-based prejudice without empirical 
research to show which groups were truly in greatest need. Then, in 
1980, the President of India appointed a commission (the Mandal 
Commission), which conducted a nationwide survey that used a va­
riety of empirical factors - including social discrimination, educa­
tional deprivation and economic status - to define groups in need, 
producing the list of 3,500 "backward classes."33 
Where Sunstein's theory and Indian reality part company is 
over the basic unit of group definition, which of course must be 
determined before relative socioeconomic status can be evaluated. 
Consistent with the core meaning of caste as descent group, in India 
the unit that is tested for potential OBC status is a group that prac­
tices extensive endogamy, restricting marriage to other group mem­
bers. Castes are paradigmatic but not exclusive examples of such 
groups. Endogamy not only provides clear group boundaries but 
also plays a major role in the intergenerational transmission of in­
equality. In contrast, Sunstein's two groups - African Americans 
and women - are each constituted in utterly different ways, and 
for women, group status has no intergenerational effects: they are 
born to rich and poor alike. 
Sunstein does not address whether the two groups he identifies 
might have differential needs for affirmative action, a sticky ques­
tion so far largely avoided in American affirmative action jurispru­
dence.34 India, though, has tackled this issue in a variety of ways. 
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, considered the most 
disadvantaged in every respect, each have their own separate quo­
tas that are generally proportional to their share of the population 
33. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29. 
34. But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (criticizing the 
"random inclusion" of Aleut, Eskimo, and Oriental categories in municipal affirmative action 
plan); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962-66 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring) (hold­
ing law school admission program to violate Equal Protection Clause because it was not 
narrowly tailored: it ignored non-Mexican Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Na­
tive Americans); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(finding federal affirmative action program for awarding government contracts not narrowly 
tailored because it included such groups as Aleuts, Samoans, and Bhutans, without evidence 
that they needed preferential treatment). 
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at the state level; they do not have to compete for these reserved 
seats against the more populous and frequently more affluent and 
influential OBCs. The OBCs often receive a reservation smaller 
than their population share because in many states the sum of the 
SC, ST, and OBC population exceeds fifty percent; the Supreme 
Court has capped total reservations at fifty percent, which means 
that the OBCs receive only what is left of the fifty percent available 
for reservation after the SC and ST quotas have been set aside.35 
Some states have begun replicating the SC/OBC dichotomy by cre­
ating two categories of OBCs: more and less backward. 
In 1992, the Indian Supreme Court created a further level of 
differentiation within beneficiary groups by imposing a means test 
for individual eligibility.36 This "creamy layer" approach addresses 
two different but related concerns: (1) that the benefits of reserva­
tions are not distributed evenly throughout a backward group but 
instead are monopolized by persons at the socioeconomic top of the 
group; and (2) that reservations are going to persons who do not in 
fact need them because they have been raised in privileged circum­
stances due to parental success in overcoming the disadvantaged 
status of the backward group.37 In contrast, Sunstein seems to as­
sume that evidence of low socioeconomic status of a person's 
ascribed group (an ascription apparently based only on the individ­
ual's physical appearance, the "highly visible characteristic") is suf­
ficient to demonstrate that person's own disadvantage, an 
assumption that underlies most American affirmative action 
programs.38 
As to the role of the different branches of government, the 
Indian approach is consistent with Sunstein's anticaste principle: 
the legislative and executive branches in India have the power and 
responsibility to initiate affirmative action schemes, and, at their 
best, do utilize their greater factfinding abilities and more flexible 
procedures to this end. But the vote bloc potential of affirmative 
action programming39 has led to abuse and public distrust. As a 
35. See Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1598-99 (panel presentation by 
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy); B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Equality and Social Justice: Rethinking 
Equality in the Global Society (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equal­
ity/reddy3.html>. 
36. See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India). 
37. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29; Rethinking Equality Conference, supra 
note 10, 1597-98 (panel presentation by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy). 
38. See Adarand, 965 F. Supp. at 1580 (criticizing federal affirmative action programs for 
contracting as overinclusive because they presume "that all those in the named minority 
groups are economically . . .  disadvantaged"). 
39. See PARIKH, supra note 28, at 169-92. 
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result, the judiciary in India has played a more active role than 
Sunstein contemplates under his anticaste principle, both in impos­
ing objective and transparent procedures for program design and 
also in actual policymaking, particularly by striking balances among 
the competing interests articulated in the constitutional text.40 The 
Indian Supreme Court has also bolstered the legitimacy of political 
decisions. In 1990, proposed executive action to expand reserva­
tions led to widespread protest and urban unrest; yet when the 
Supreme Court two years later approved most of the proposed 
changes, public acceptance was equally widespread.41 
CONCLUSION 
The Indian "anticaste principle" incorporates, rather than sup­
plants, a general antidiscrimination principle. Like the "colorblind 
Constitution," Indian equality jurisprudence aspires to secure a so­
ciety free of all distinctions based on caste; but at the same time, it 
permits as a necessary means to that end caste-based remedial pro­
grams - but only when those programs are carefully designed, lim­
ited, and self-liquidating over time. Anticaste and 
antidiscrimination principles are integrated into a single jurispru­
dence in which both equality and discrimination have more com­
plex meanings than in American legal discourse. Substantive and 
not merely formal equality is guaranteed, and discrimination can be 
"positive" and "compensatory."42 
The Indian perspective is that the basic philosophy of affirma­
tive action is nothing but the rationale of a just and fair social order. 
Affirmative action is not an exception to equality of treatment, but 
a method of providing it, by enabling all individuals to perform ac­
cording to their potentials. 
40. For example, both the 50% cap on total reservations and the creamy layer test were 
imposed by the Indian Supreme Court without explicit support in the constitutional text. See 
Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29. 
41. The fact that the Supreme Court opened its processes to many interested parties and 
conducted very many public hearings over a span of months may have contributed to this 
result. See id. However, there continues to be strong criticism of the Manda! Commission 
Report and the Supreme Court's decision in the Sawhney case from Indian intellectuals. See, 
e.g., Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1657-60 (panel presentation by M.N. 
Srinivas). 
42. Constitutional discourse in the new South Africa, based in part on India's example, 
differentiates between "fair " and "unfair" discrimination in permitting various kinds of af­
firmative action. See Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1624-28 (panel pres­
entation by Karthigasen Govender); id. at 1675 (closing speech by Clark D. Cunningham); 
Karthigasen Govender, Equality - The South African Perspective (visited Feb. 19, 1999) 
<http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equality/Gov-art4.htini>. 
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There is enough empirical evidence in both India and the 
United States to suggest that some sections of society suffer from 
social, economic, and cultural disabilities - through no fault of 
their own - that deny them equal access to scarce resources. 
Therefore, we suggest that government focus primary attention on 
designing and implementing affirmative action programs, identifyM 
ing beneficiaries, and evaluating the permissible limits of preferenM 
tial standards. The Indian experience with affirmative action, 
particularly in the recent past, certainly reveals many pitfalls that 
attend different program designs, schemes of certification of benefiM 
ciaries, and methods of adjudging compatibility of programs with 
constitutional guarantees of equality of opportunity. 
India's most difficult problem has been identifying the benefiM 
ciaries for affirmative action programs. The initial effort was strucM 
tured in terms of caste: the Central Government in India identified 
the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and the Constitution itself proM 
vided the methodology of identification. In the case of the SCs and 
STs, a problem arose when it was discovered that (1) the benefits 
were being appropriated by the relatively betterMoffs among 
Scheduled Castes, and (2) the beneficiaries could not reach higher 
levels of education and employment, despite the reservation, beM 
cause of systemic factors for which reservation alone was not the 
best solution. A more intractable problem arose when the govemM 
ment sought to extend the reservation to "other backward classes" 
for which the Constitution had only provided enabling provisions 
but not a mechanism for identification. The quick and ready methM 
ods of identification adopted by political leaders in different states 
were shot down by the courts on the ground of unfair discriminaM 
tion. The courts interpreted the "reasonable classification test" of 
the equality guarantee to require two criteria: (1) that the purpose 
of the classification be clear and legitimate, and (2) that there be a 
sufficient link between the classification criteria used and the govM 
ernmental objectives. 
There are two dangers against which affirmative action should 
be guarded if it is to survive challenges. First, it must be self M 
liquidating - and seen to be so - in order to redeem itself from 
the compulsions of electoral politics inevitable in democratic socieM 
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ties.43 Second, we must reassess existing strategies in light of better 
knowledge of social reality now available from the social sciences.44 
What would an American affirmative action plan for law school 
admissions look like if it made use of caste-like categories? The 
likely effect would be to reduce the absolute number of persons 
eligible for affirmative action in comparison to conventional race­
based plans, even if the number of identified groups was expanded 
somewhat beyond the four commonly listed: black, Hispanic, 
Native American and Asian.45 (However, we certainly would not 
expect that, like India, a list of 3,500 distinct groups would be gen­
erated!) The Indian approach has been to create artificial groups, 
identified by abbreviated functional titles (such as OBC), that use 
intersecting cultural, social and economic factors to narrow, not ex­
pand, the number of potentially eligible persons. The first limiting 
principle is that a person must be a member of a group distin­
guished by endogamy. A group that intermarries freely with other 
groups, although identifiable in other ways, would not be eligible.46 
The second limitation would be that the endogamous group be sig­
nificantly below average levels of educational attainment, such as 
the percentage of members graduating from high school. The third 
factor would consist of a mix of socioeconomic factors indicative of 
continuing effects of past discrimination.47 It is likely that such het­
erogenous categories as "Asian" and "Hispanic" would break into 
much more discrete units, some of which would present more com­
pelling cases for affirmative action than others; such a process 
might even take place within the group now called African-Ameri­
can, which, at least to the eyes of an anthropologist, might also be 
43. Affirmative action has a tendency to perpetuate itself, reinforcing the divisions in 
society that it is meant to liquidate. 
44. For example, Claude Steele, Joshua Aronson, and other psychologists have docu­
mented a "stereotype threat effect" that depresses performance by academically skilled 
African Americans on standardized tests like the LSAT. Their research shows that African­
American test performance can be equalized with comparable white test takers simply by 
altering the testing instructions so as to remove the stereotype threat. See Joshua Aronson et 
al., Stereotype Threat and the Academic Underperformance of Minorities and Women, in 
PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE 83, 88-90 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 
1998); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 619-21 (1997). 
45. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995). 
46. Endogamy is a cultural practice which (1) is likely to be found in groups that suffered 
from de jure segregation, (2) is a reliable indicator of continuing de facto segregation, (3) but 
is not limited to racial categories, and ( 4) is likely to reflect the group's own understanding of 
its boundaries (both as to extent and permeability). 
47. In Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29, we coin the acronym EDISEG to describe 
such groups (Educationally Deprived, Involuntarily Segregated, Endogamous Groups). 
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quite heterogenous.48 An interesting approach might be to work 
backwards from the bottom twenty-five percent of LSAT takers, 
looking inductively for clusters of factors that correlate strongly 
with low test performance. Such research at the moment would be 
seriously limited by the current practice of collecting demographic 
data in terms of the five large "racial" categories. This approach 
results in such gross generalizations as "Asians do well on the 
LSAT and therefore do not need affirmative action." If more pre­
cise units, defined by endogamy were used, much smaller groups 
within the vague category "Asian" might appear with intersecting 
features comparable to current statistics assigned to African Ameri­
cans, for example. The resulting set of categories might well pro­
duce a system more subtle and more just than simple, and mutually 
exclusive, reliance on either "race" or "class." 
48. For one such anthropological analysis, see VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEF­
INITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN CREOLE LouisIANA (1986). Economist Glenn C. 
Loury has argued that affirmative action is not needed by all African Americans, but instead 
should be focused on a distinct group whose members share the following characteristics: (1) 
slave descendants, (2) originally rural and Southern, (3) but now emigrated to northern cities, 
(4) where they are now "locked in ghettos." See Glenn C. Loury, The Hard Questions: 
Double Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 23. He uses the term "caste" in describing 
this group. See id. 
